国企混改、股权激励与企业绩效--基于格力电器的案例研究

本文从国企混改进入全方位深化的现实背景出发,对格力电器自上市以来混合所有制改革进行深入研究,分析了公司混改方案及对应的股权结构的变化。通过EVA分析得到混改导致公司财务业绩大幅上升,并从股权激励的视角分析了格力电器市盈率长期低于美的集团的现象。随着格力电器新一轮混改的完成,可以预见其将为相关各方创造更大价值。格力电器混改的模式对国有企业混改特别是竞争性国企混改具有借鉴意义。     

异质性机构投资者差异化作用于双元创新投资吗 ——基于注意力基础观与市场迎合理论双重视角

基于2011-2020年沪深A股高新技术企业样本,探究公司治理框架下异质性机构投资者对企业双元创新投资的差异化作用机理,得出如下结论：①异质性机构投资者对于双元创新投资具有差异化影响,其中,专注型机构投资者更有利于双元创新投资;②专注型机构投资者影响决策者注意力资源配置,使其更注重探索性创新投资,临时型机构投资者基于市场迎合动机作用于开发性创新投资,且当管理层业绩和外部监管压力较大时,其对开发性创新投资的迎合动机更明显;③专注型机构投资者通过监督和激励管理层、提升企业风险承担水平作用于企业双元创新投资,临时型机构投资者通过丰富投资者情绪作用于开发性创新投资未得到验证;④产业政策有助于增强专注型机构投资者对决策者注意力的影响,使其更专注于探索性创新投资,同时也有助于提高临时型机构投资者的开发性创新迎合投资动机。研究结论为理解机构投资者差异化治理角色提供了一种新视角。     

股东对创新投入的反应：股权激励异质性的信号作用

以我国2017—2019年沪深两市A股实施股权激励的上市企业为样本,基于股东视角分析股东对创新投入信息的反应,探讨这一反应在股权高度集中时的变化,并考察高管团队股权激励异质性因素向股东传递信号的机制。结果表明,创新投入与股东反应正相关;股权集中度正向调节创新投入与股东反应的关系;股权激励异质性负向调节创新投入与股东反应的关系,且该效应在民企中更加显著;经营风险是股权激励异质性负向影响股东对创新投入反应的中介变量。     

数据要素市场培育：法律难题、域外经验与中国方案

数字经济时代,数据继土地、劳动力、资本、技术之后成为第五大生产要素。目前我国数据权属确定的法律制度不够完善,数据要素市场交易的法律制度尚未建立,数据要素市场监管的法律制度不够健全,这都制约了我国数据要素市场发展。为了培育数据要素市场,应以数据生产者与数据处理者为划分标准,建立“数据生产者（扩展权利)—数据处理者（有限产权)”的数据产权制度;以“降低制度成本—减少交易成本”的思路完善数据要素市场交易相关规则;以“事前预防与事后规制相结合”的方式完善数据要素市场监管法律制度。     

市场分割条件下的混合所有制经济竞争模型与规制策略

通过构建市场分割条件下的混合所有制经济竞争模型,本文对全国性国有企业在中国改革发展过程中的作用提供了新的解释。全国性国有企业在参与区域竞争的过程中,具备一种区域整合的功能:它面向全体市场的决策与分别面向各区域市场的决策等价,全社会总剩余最大化目标也可以分解为各区域社会剩余最大化的子目标之和,在其效率较高的情况下,将迫使地方企业改进成本或者退出市场,而只有当地方企业有足够高的效率的时候,全国性国有企业才会选择退出策略。国有企业事实上可以作为一种内部规制工具对市场分割的负面效应进行一定程度的制衡,在明确规制规则的条件下,我们可以通过动态调整企业目标函数以实现整体市场福利的最大化。     

宏观经济波动对工业所有制结构的影响——"国进民退"的回顾与前瞻

本文利用1998—2008年的样本数据,通过实证方法研究宏观经济波动对工业所有制结构的影响,结果表明经济增长速度、货币存量、出口增长率以及通货膨胀与国有工业比重下降速度均呈负相关关系,这说明国进民退是宏观经济景气度影响的结果。因此,我们认为宏观调控政策应从优化国有与非国有企业的融资环境、对微观结构影响的程度等方面去改善国有与非国有工业企业的经营环境。     

改善民生是中国城乡统筹改革实践的原动力

民生是中国城乡统筹改革实践的原动力。改革起始期,是民生呼唤下的自发改革与政策调整;改革深入期,是民生推动下的体制转轨与制度创新;改革攻坚期,是民生引导下的统筹发展与新农村建设。30年农村改革历程,致使民生问题的不断解决与改革的渐进式节奏相互吻合,推动着"人本"式的农村改革健康有序地发展。     

Corporate Ownership and Environmental Proactivity

The present paper advances knowledge of the drivers of firms' proactive environmental strategies. In particular, it explores the relationship between different corporate ownership structures and firms' green proactivity, in order to see whether some types of shareholder act as a stimulating driver for firms' proactive environmental behaviors. The study examines the explanatory power of corporate governance issues, such as a firm's ownership structure, as potential determinants of companies' environmental proactivity. Attention is focused on the European firms included into the Carbon Disclosure Project questionnaire 2012. The results show that ownership structure matters in firms' environmental proactivity. In particular, firms with a higher percentage of state ownership present superior green proactivity, while ownership concentration appears negatively related to proactive environmental strategy. The paper offers theoretical and practical implications. It focuses attention on a still underdeveloped research area, namely organizations and their relationship with the natural environment, including corporate ownership as a driver of a company's proactive environmental strategy. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

External corporate governance and financial fraud: cognitive evaluation theory insights on agency theory prescriptions

R esearch summary : Agency theory suggests that external governance mechanisms (e.g., activist owners, the market for corporate control, securities analysts) can deter managers from acting opportunistically. Using cognitive evaluation theory, we argue that powerful expectations imposed by external governance can impinge on top managers' feelings of autonomy and crowd out their intrinsic motivation, potentially leading to financial fraud. Our findings indicate that external pressure from activist owners, the market for corporate control, and securities analysts increases managers' likelihood of financial fraud. Our study considers external governance from a top manager's perspective and questions one of agency theory's foundational tenets: that external pressure imposed on managers reduces the potential for moral hazard. M anagerial summary : Many of us are familiar with stories about top managers “cooking the books” in one way or another. As a result, companies and regulatory bodies often implement strict controls to try to prevent financial fraud. However, cognitive evaluation theory describes how those external controls could actually have the opposite of their intended effect because they rob managers of their intrinsic motivation for behaving appropriately. We find this to be the case. When top managers face more stringent external control mechanisms, in the form of activist shareholders, the threat of a takeover, or zealous securities analysts, they are actually more likely to engage in financial misbehavior. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC PENSION PLAN INVESTMENT RETURN. The role of fund value maximization and public choice theory

Public pension plans are a major type of institutional owner during the new era of investor capitalism, yet little is known about them. Based upon fund value maximization (FVM) and public choice theory (PCT), we develop hypotheses on the determinants of plan performance as measured by plan annual investment return. FVM espouses that the plan's fund or investment portfolio will be invested to maximize return for a given level of risk, while PCT holds that agency costs are significant in the public sector, and will have a negative effect on plan return. Using biennial pension plan data for 1992–96 for several hundred plans, we found that fund value maximization has a much greater influence on plan performance, but that plan performance is also subject to agency costs associated with public choice theory.